A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat

Bram Driesen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be sustained in SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players’ (expected) payoffs in SPE are unique. The assumption further leads to a responder advantage.
Original languageEnglish
Article number87
Number of pages8
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2021


  • multilateral bargaining
  • Multilateral bargaining


Dive into the research topics of 'A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this