A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat

Bram Driesen

doi:10.3390/g12040087

A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat

Bram Driesen

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be sustained in SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players’ (expected) payoffs in SPE are unique. The assumption further leads to a responder advantage.

Original language	English
Article number	87
Number of pages	8
Journal	Games
Volume	12
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040087
Publication status	Published - Dec 2021

Keywords

multilateral bargaining
Multilateral bargaining

Access to Document

10.3390/g12040087Licence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{fdffed9d169049289beee755ce1b926d,

title = "A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat",

abstract = "This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be sustained in SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players{\textquoteright} (expected) payoffs in SPE are unique. The assumption further leads to a responder advantage.",

keywords = "multilateral bargaining, Multilateral bargaining",

author = "Bram Driesen",

year = "2021",

month = dec,

doi = "10.3390/g12040087",

language = "English",

volume = "12",

journal = "Games",

issn = "2073-4336",

publisher = "Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI)",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat

AU - Driesen, Bram

PY - 2021/12

Y1 - 2021/12

N2 - This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be sustained in SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players’ (expected) payoffs in SPE are unique. The assumption further leads to a responder advantage.

AB - This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be sustained in SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players’ (expected) payoffs in SPE are unique. The assumption further leads to a responder advantage.

KW - multilateral bargaining

KW - Multilateral bargaining

U2 - 10.3390/g12040087

DO - 10.3390/g12040087

M3 - Article

SN - 2073-4336

VL - 12

JO - Games

JF - Games

IS - 4

M1 - 87

ER -

A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this