Abstract
Verifying security of advanced cryptographic primitives such as attribute-based encryption (ABE) is often difficult. In this work, we show how to break eleven schemes: two single-authority and nine multi-authority (MA) ABE schemes. Notably, we break DAC-MACS, a highly-cited multi-authority scheme, published at TIFS. This suggests that, indeed, verifying security of complex schemes is complicated, and may require simpler tools. The multi-authority attacks also illustrate that mistakes are made in transforming single-authority schemes into multi-authority ones. To simplify verifying security, we systematize our methods to a linear approach to analyzing generic security of ABE. Our approach is not only useful in analyzing existing schemes, but can also be applied during the design and reviewing of new schemes. As such, it can prevent the employment of insecure (MA-)ABE schemes in the future.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2021 |
Subtitle of host publication | CT-RSA 2021 |
Editors | Kenneth G. Paterson |
Place of Publication | Switzerland |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 100-125 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Volume | 12704 |
Edition | 1e |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783030755393 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030755386 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 11 May 2021 |
Event | Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference 2021 - Online, San Francisco, United States Duration: 17 May 2021 → 20 May 2021 https://sites.google.com/site/ctrsa2021/ |
Publication series
Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
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Volume | 12704 |
ISSN | 0302-9743 |
Conference
Conference | Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference 2021 |
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Abbreviated title | CT-RSA 2021 |
Country/Territory | United States |
City | San Francisco |
Period | 17/05/21 → 20/05/21 |
Internet address |
Keywords
- ABE
- Attacks
- Attribute-based encryption
- Cryptanalysis
- Multi-authority attribute
- Multi-authority attribute-based encryption