How to deal with the redistributive impact of environmental goods? Assessing David Miller’s account

The provision of environmental goods has inevitably distributive implications
because some will use or value environmental goods more than others. Most egalitarian
theories of distributive justice, have been focused on the redistribution of privately-held
goods and leave the redistributive impact of public goods, such as environmental goods,
aside. One exception to this public goods gap in theories of justice is David Miller.
According to Miller we need to measure the redistributive impact of public goods and
develop a tax scheme which maximizes ‘equalizing of net gains’. Miller’s account has not
been undisputed. According to Humprey, Miller ignores the irreplaceability of
environmental goods. According to Hannis, Miller fails to make a distinction between
wants and ideals. I will argue that Miller’s position can be maintained against these two
criticisms. It will be, nevertheless, argued that there are fundamental desirability and
feasibility problems with Miller’s approach in that it relies on economic valuation. A onedimensional measure such as economic valuation is not suitable to deal with the
incommensurable aspect of environmental goods. Dealing with incommensurability
requires a more deliberative approach. Moreover, Miller’s approach reduces public goods
to a matter of efficiency and distribution and leaves no room for value-based public
goods.