On the person and office of the sovereign in Hobbes’ Leviathan

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Abstract

I contextualize and interpret the distinction in Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) between the capacities of the sovereign and show its importance for contemporary debates on the nature of Hobbesian sovereignty. Hobbes distinguishes between actions the sovereign does on personal title (as a natural person), and actions he undertakes in a political capacity (as artificial person and in the office of representative of the state). I argue that, like royalists defending King Charles I before and during the English civil war, he maintains that the highest magistrate is sovereign in both his natural and political capacities because the capacities are inseparable, though district. This position goes back to the treatment of Calvin’s Case by Francis Bacon and Edward Coke and has further precedents in medieval English constitutional thought. An important reason for Hobbes to include this doctrine in Leviathan, I suggest, is to provide a response to parliamentarians who employed the sovereign’s multiple capacities to justify armed resistance against the king. I show the relevance of this contextualization by intervening in two recent debates, regarding the possibility of constitutionalist limitations on the actions of the Hobbesian sovereign and regarding whether sovereignty is held by the commonwealth or by the person of the sovereign.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)49-68
Number of pages20
JournalBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume28
Issue number1
Early online date10 Jun 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Jan 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Thomas Hobbes
  • Calvin's Case
  • sovereignty
  • authorization
  • constitutionalism

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